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The concept of the divine form of human 
being has been mentioned in various descrip-
tions in the three largest Abrahamic religions. 
The Judeo-Christian traditional approach to 
Imago Dei (The Image of God) holds three 
major perspectives: substantive, functional, 
and relational. Ibn ‘Arabī, as a Muslim 
thinker and mystic, explained this concept 
through the concept of mirror and two other 
concepts, namely the ‘Perfect Man’ and God’s 
vicegerency. He considered the divine form of 
human being as a mirror through which God 
manifests Himself. This paper provides a 
comprehensive overview of Ibn ‘Arabī’s  
interpretation in light of Judeo-Christian  
approaches. Ibn ‘Arabī’s explanation includes 
three approaches. Through the concept of per-
fect man, Ibn ‘Arabī’s explanation approaches 
the substantive interpretation, and through the 
concept of vicegerency, he reveals the func-
El concepto de la forma divina del ser humano 
es mencionado en varias descripciones en las 
tres religiones abrahámicas mayores. El enfo-
que tradicional judeocristiano de Imago Dei 
(La imagen de Dios) tiene tres perspectivas 
principales: sustantiva, funcional y relacional. 
Ibn ‘Arabī, como pensador y místico musul-
mán, explicó esta idea a través del concepto 
de espejo y otros dos conceptos, a saber, el 
‘Hombre Perfecto’ y la vicegerencia de Dios. 
Consideró la forma divina del ser humano 
como un espejo a través del cual Dios se ma-
nifiesta. Este artículo ofrece una visión general 
comprensiva de la interpretación de Ibn ‘Arabī 
a la luz de los enfoques judeocristianos. La ex-
plicación de Ibn ‘Arabī incluye tres enfoques. 
A través del concepto del hombre perfecto, la 
explicación de Ibn ‘Arabī se acerca a la inter-
pretación sustantiva, y a través del concepto 
de vicegerencia, revela la interpretación fun-
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1. Introduction  
 
The concept of Imago Dei concerns the divine form as manifest  
in human beings. The theory originates with Judeo-Christian tradition 
and derives from the Old Testament. Borrowing their substantive, func-
tional and relational approaches, Ibn ‘Arabī1 interpreted the theory 
nearly a thousand years ago. The concept initially appeared among 
Muslims with mystics like Shiblī and Ḥallāj.2 Ghazzālī also analyzed 
it but Ibn ‘Arabī’s approach became an integral part of his philosophical 
system. His paradigm recognizes three major attitudes and lends per-
spective on human nature and purpose. His school of thought intimately 
entwines with anthropology and substantially influenced later schools 
of thought. This paper acknowledges and attempts to decode his most 
important contributions in light of Judeo-Christian concepts. 
Abrahamic religious expositors often emphasize the divine form  
of the human being. The source of the theory is found in the Old  
Testament; “Let us make humankind in our image, according to our 
likeness”.3 The New Testament presents this divine form as optimized 
in Christ as the human archetype or Imago Dei. Thus, humans are said 
to have potential to perfect the image actualized through Christ.4 In Is-
1  Muḥyī l-Dīn Muḥammad b. ʻAlī b. Muḥammad al-ʻArabī, born in Murcia, al-An-
dalus (1165 CE). 
2  Although they were not Ibn ‘Arabī’s teachers, they debated the concept of divine 
image (form) for the first time among the Muslim mystics.
3  Then God said, “Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness; 
and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over 
the cattle, and over all the wild animals of the earth, and over every creeping thing that 
creeps upon the earth. So God created humankind in his image, in the image of God he 
created them, male and female he created them” (Gen: Genesis. 2001, English Standard 
Version (ESV), 1: 26-27). 
4  Schwanz, Imago Dei, p. 21. For detailed histories on the theology of Imago Dei see: 
Berkower, Man: The Image of God, chapters 2, p. 37 and chapter 3, p. 67; Cairnes, The 
Image of God in Man, p. 146. 
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tional interpretation. The paper recognizes a 
relational interpretation of the divine form 
through some contradictory explanations 
which can be found in his books. This survey 
of his explanation also sheds much light on 
aspects of his anthropological perspective.  
Key Words: Imago Dei; substantive; func-
tional; relational; mirror; Lord.
cional. El artículo reconoce una interpretación 
relacional de la forma divina a través de algu-
nas explicaciones contradictorias que pueden 
hallarse en sus libros. Este análisis de su  
explicación también arroja bastante luz sobre 
aspectos de su perspectiva antropológica. 
Palabras clave: Imago Dei; sustantivo; fun-
cional; relacional; espejo; Señor. 
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lamic thought God originated everything, including mankind who has 
a special position among all creatures. The Qurʾān says: 
We have honored the sons of Adam; provided them with transport on land and 
sea, given them for sustenance things good and pure, and conferred on them spe-
cial favors above a great part of our creation…5 When I have fashioned him (in 
due proportion) and breathed into him of my spirit, fall ye down in obeisance 
unto him.6 
Prophet Muḥammad also mentioned Adam’s priority over other 
creatures. One of the most famous ḥadiths mirrors the Old Testament’s 
motif by stating God created Adam in His form.7 
Different scholars use various methods and approaches to explain 
Imago Dei. Some interpret the divine form anthropomorphically ac-
cording to physical likeness.8 St. Augustine, a chief representative of 
this view, explained it as ‘prototype’. Nonetheless, the theme of ‘man’s 
relationship to God’ runs through all interpretations. 
Recent commentators on Ibn ‘Arabī’s works pay much attention to 
his explanation in light of his ‘Perfect Man’ and ‘Unity of Being’ (waḥ-
dat al- wujūd) theories.9 ‘Afīfī (1939) explains Ibn ‘Arabī’s concept by 
using the latter’s singular perspective on universal reason and pan- 
theism.10 However, ‘Afīfī does not expound on universal reason or its 
5  Qurʾān, Abdullah Yusuf Ali, 17:70.












8  McFague, “The world as God’s body”, p. 4. 
9  This theory posits there is nothing besides God and that existence belongs to God 
and that everything else is His manifestation. Hence, God’s Being has three levels: absolute 
oneness or Aḥadīyat; the oneness of many-ness (kathrat) in which His names appear; and 
the objective world (cf. Ashtiani, Sayyed Jalal-ed-din, Muqaddamah-ʼi Qaysạrī bar sharh-̣
i Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam-i ibn ʻArabī, Tehran, Amir Kabir Publication, 1991, p. 205; Chittick, W., 
“Qūnawī on the One Wujūd”, Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn Arabi Society, 49 (2011), pp. 
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function regarding the relationship between God and man. Henry 
Corbin (1988) posits that Imago Dei implies that God shines through 
humanity and presents an existential narration of the human ‘self’ based 
on Ibn ‘Arabī’s thought. Nasr (1988) offers a mystical narration of Ibn 
‘Arabī’s text while William Chittick (1994, 1989 & 2005) writes at 
some length on Ibn ‘Arabī’s ‘Perfect Man’ and the Divine Names. 
Izutsu, whose interpretation reflects ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī’s ex-
position of Ibn ‘Arabī’s thought (1966), keeps to Sufi terms and ana-
lyzes elements of Imago Dei using mysticism’s terminology. 
Most scholars examine Ibn ‘Arabī’s positions on Imago Dei in 
terms of his theological worldview. But numerous such commentators 
have not investigated Imago Dei as a singular concept in theological, 
philosophical or existential contexts. Consequently, the present work 
reviews the cited Judeo-Christian approaches to show their potential 
application(s) to Ibn ‘Arabī’s textual content(s). The authors specifi-
cally analyze his definition of ‘Divine Form’ through the Judeo-Chris-
tian relational approach to demonstrate how Ibn ‘Arabī reached his 
existential interpretation(s).  
 
 
2. Judeo-Christian Approaches of Imago Dei 
 
Five major concepts are used to illustrate Imago Dei in Judeo-
Christian theology. First, is the anthropomorphite, which interprets 
Imago Dei as a physical phenomenon;11 the second posits God’s 
‘being’ as the Trinitarian prototype; the third defines God’s image in 
terms of man’s dominion over creation; the fourth considers the Image 
of God in ethical and cognitive terms; the fifth says it is societal in 
10  Waḥdat al-wujūd concerns a variety of religious-philosophical doctrines that define 
mystical pantheism. Instead of naturalistic pantheism, which dissolves God within nature, 
mystical pantheism dissolves nature within God and refers to the principle: ‘All is God’. 
See: Stepaniants, Sufi Wisdom, p. 24. As for Ibn ‘Arabī’s pantheism: Nasr disputes that 
pantheism is even a philosophical system and that Ibn ‘Arabī does not have a philosophy 
at all since he never claimed to follow or create any such system (Nasr, Three Muslim 
Sages, pp. 104-105).
11  Lidums, “The doctrine of Imago Dei”, p. 2. In the Islamic tradition there is a theo-
logical idea that attributes God with physical features called Mujāsama c.f. Kashf al-Murād 
fī sharḥ Tajrīd al-‘itiqād, Khāje Naṣīr ad-Dīn Ṭūsī, explained by Ḥasan Bin Yusif Ḥīlī, 
Qum, Imām Ṣādīq Institute, 2003, p. 25.
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nature.12 
Another classification system takes six approaches to Imago Dei: (1) 
those who distinguish between a natural and supernatural likeness of 
God; (2) those who define likeness as spiritual capabilities; (3) those who 
interpret the image as an external form: (4) those who oppose the third 
group; (5) those who believe the human being is God’s counterpart; (6) 
and those who interpret it as man’s ability to represent God on earth.13 
Yet another system utilizes four approaches: (1) man’s dominion over 
creation; (2) the image as moral virtue; (3) the image as moral capacity; 





Millard Erickson (1983-85) integrated interpretative categorizations 
of Imago Dei into three major groups: substantive, functional15 and re-
lational16. Substantive views suggest God gave His features to human 
beings, which implies man exists in the actual form of God; and thus 
concerns human essence and substance (physical structure).  
Pre-modern discussions on humanity concerned human nature and 
post-modern theological, philosophical and anthropological drifts 
changed the discourse to man’s capacity to know God as well as to 
mankind’s fall. For scholars such as Thomas Aquinas, however, the 
analysis of human nature helped to explain common features shared 
by man and God.  
Irenaeus was the first theologian to systematically discuss Imago 
Dei in terms of endowments such as the rational mind and free will.17 
In fact, Irenaeus was the first to declare that an everlasting human com-
12  Lidums, “The doctrine of Imago Dei”, p. 1.
13  Claus Westermann, Genesis (vol. 1, p. 148), Biblischer Kommentar, Altes Testament 
(Neukirchen, Neukirchen Verlag, 1980). Quoted in Hefner P.J., “The Human Being” in 
Christian Dogmatics (vol. 1, p. 330), C.E. Braaten and R.W. Jenson (eds.), Philadelphia, 
Fortress Press, 1960, pp. 323-340. 
14  Crabb, Understanding People, p. 89.
15  Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics, p. 250.
16  Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, p. 56.
17  Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, vol. 2, p. 123. Irenaeu differentiates 
image from similitude. He considered the image to consist of endowments; i.e., a rational 
mind and free will. He perceived similitude as the gratuitous life of the Spirit that was lost 
through the ‘Fall’ but restored by grace in Christ (Genesis 1: 27). 
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ponent of Imago Dei actually belonged to man’s substance and 
stemmed from primal creation: this being the human capacity for ra-
tionality. Although some aspects of his theory were challenged and later 
rejected, the major thematic of the ‘indispensable’ part of man’s struc-
ture and personality remains. 
Man possesses capacities and faculties that distinguish him from 
the balance of creation.18 According to Augustine, these are manifested 
as an ability to reason (rational mind), a faculty that incorporates mem-
ory, understanding and free will.19 Augustine’s commentary on Genesis 
indicates human significance consists of being made in God’s image 
for the purpose exercising dominion over all creatures without a ca-
pacity to reason. Thus, being in God’s image indicates that humans 
possess a mind capable of reasoning and comprehension.20 Having 
been influenced by Irenaeus as well as Peter Lombard and Anselm, 
Aquinas’ formulation of Imago Dei was therefore based on anthropol-
ogy. As such, he further stipulated that man’s natural powers of reason 
and free will were endowments of righteousness.21 
Rahner, a contemporary agent of Roman Catholic theological an-
thropology, wrote “The more we become what we are, free beings en-
dowed with a certain degree of power, the more we see him to whom 
this subject of lordship, which never belongs to ourselves, can be en-
trusted-God”.22 Rahner says man has a metaphysical dimension he calls 
‘spiritual essence’ and posits that God created man in His image with 
this ‘spiritual essence’ as an indispensable part of human constitution. 
Every human being, therefore, possesses a supernatural existential di-
mension that precedes the advent of individual freedom as well as self-
understanding and experience.23 
18  Barth and Bromiley, Church Dogmatics, vol. 1, p. 186.
19  Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics, p. 250.
20  Mahoney, “Evolution, Altruism and the Image of God”, p. 5.
21  Aquinas, 13.1a.93.2 notea; Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, vol. 2, 
p. 124.
22  Rahner, Do you believe in God, p. 53.
23  Rahner, Foundation of Christian Faith, p. 126. Rahner (1978) considered man both 
person and subject. His concept of ‘personhood’ comprises four determinations: (1) tran-
scendence; responsibility and freedom; (2) a tendency towards incomprehensible mystery; 
(3) a ‘being’ within both world and history; (4) and social nature. Rahner posited that free-
dom and responsibility were not mundane faculties but directly related to man’s subjective 
entirety: “In real freedom the subject always intends himself, understands and posits him-
self. Ultimately he does not do something, but he does himself. Freedom is the capacity of 
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Niebuhr (1963) agrees with Augustine (1991)24 regarding reason 
and self-consciousness. Paul Tillich (1951) explains Imago Dei as 
man’s comprehensive wholeness. Taken together, Augustine, Niebuhr 
and Tillich form a kind of theological sect. Augustine was determined 
to transcend and ascend: “I will pass beyond this power of mine which 
is called memory; yea I will pass beyond it that I may approach unto 
Thee”.25 Niebuhr’s approach to self-transcendence per Imago Dei 
sought a relationship with God in the end.26 And Tillich interpreted 
Imago Dei as rationality plus a wider faculty for ontological reasoning, 
through which man comprehends complex levels of reality, which pro-





The definitive functional quality concerning Imago Dei is that of 
man’s relationships with the Creator, His creation and with each other. 
Niebuhr and Tillich considered the faculty of reason an actual link with 
God. Hence, the relational approach interprets Imago Dei as an expe-
riential process between man and ‘other’. This involvement requires 
mutual understanding and experience that are neither coincidental nor 
qualitatively equivalent. Therefore, no universal human divine form 
exists for all humans or for life’s entirety. This specific interpretation 
is the crux of what it means to be in the ‘form of God’.  
 
one subject to decide about himself in his single totality” (Rahner, p. 94). Finally, since 
“freedom of the subject in relation to himself is his final and definitive validity” (Ibid, p. 
100), man is free to say yes or no to God. This is something Rahner argued as ‘the funda-
mental option’ (Ibid, p. 93).
24  Early theologians were influenced by Greek philosophy and metaphysics and 
many considered reason a unique human characteristic. For example, Aquinas believed 
whoever lacks an intelligent mind does not qualify as Imago Dei. However, he thought 
animals had a partial likeness to God, since they exist and live (Aquinas, ST.13.1a. 93.2 
notea).
25  Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation, vol. 1, p. 165. 
26  Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 25.
27  Tillich, Systemic Theology, p. 160.
28  Many theologians considered this approach, including Bohnhoeffer, Barth, Brunner, 
Macquairrie, Cullman and others. However, we chose Barth and Brunner because their 
conceptualization of Imago Dei approaches Ibn ‘Arabī’s perspectives. 
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Karl Barth and Emil Brunner are esteemed theologians of the rela-
tional approach and founders of neo-orthodoxy.29 For Barth, Imago Dei 
is neither a quality nor any essential human attribution but rather man’s 
inherently existential relationship with God. Barth considers here the 
plural pronoun ‘us’ as well as dynamics within the Godhead implicit 
in the verse: “Let us make man in our image”. For him, the inclusive 
pronoun ‘us’ demonstrates a differential relationship between ‘I’ and 
‘Thou’ even within God.30 This ‘I-Thou’ relationship is therefore a 
God-given enabling that allows man to enter into relationships with 
God and others.31 Consequently, man never ceases to ‘be’ Imago Dei.32 
Brunner’s greatest and most enduring impact was that he insisted that 
God becomes known solely by a personal encounter33 because He cre-
ated mankind for an especially personal relationship. Hence, God does 
not merely manifest His glory to man as with other creatures, but God 
actually wills to possess man as a free being,34 although this liberty is 
limited due to man’s responsibility before God. Brunner explains:  
This is the heart of his being as man and it is the ‘condition’ on which he pos-
sesses freedom. In other words, this limited human freedom exists so he may re-
spond to God in such a way that through this response God may glorify Himself 
and give Himself to His creature.35 
29  Rahner, Foundation of Christian Faith, p. 126; Montgomery, “Neo-Orthodox The-
ology”, p. 4.  Emil Brunner wrote The Theology of Crisis as a Neo-orthodox theologian 
with an outstanding reputation in America. See Kim, “From Neo-orthodox to rationalistic 
Deism: A study of the Religious Influence on the Development of John Rawls’s Political 
Philosophy”, p. 26.
30  Barth and Bromiley, Church Dogmatics, vol. 3, p. 192.
31  Barth and Bromiley, Church Dogmatics, vol. 3, p. 198. This ‘I–Thou’ confrontation 
exists within the Godhead and provides a foundation for man’s creation; implying man’s 
capacity for relationship is naturally inherent. Barth wrote that the ‘I–Thou’ between Father 
and Son within the godhead is prototypical of Imago Dei (Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. 
3, p. 220). 
32  Barth: “Man can and will always be man before God and among his fellows only 
as he is man in relationship to woman and woman in relationship to man. And as he is one 
or the other he is man. … The fact that he was created man and woman will be the great 
paradigm of everything that is to take place between him and God, and also of everything 
that is to take place between him and his fellows” (Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. 3,  
p. 186). 
33  Linder, “Brunner, Heinrich Emil”, p. 175.
34  Brunner wrote: “The doctrine of Imago Dei in particular is the fundamental principle 
of the Protestant doctrine of justice” (Brunner, The Christian Doctrine, p. 39). 
35  Brunner, The Christian Doctrine, p. 56.
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In addition to this personal attitude towards his personal concept of 
God, Brunner says every person is responsible to God, which account-
ability constitutes man’s actual existence regardless if he does or does 
not believe, specifically because man was created to respond to God. 
This inherent ‘law of responsibility’ not only establishes formal exis-
tential structure for purposeful existence36 but also “universally applies 
to every human being by definition”.37 Brunner considered this his for-
mal aspect of Imago Dei by defining it as “that which distinguishes 
man, whether believer or unbeliever, from non-human creation”.38 For-
mally, therefore,39 Brunner’s concept of Imago Dei comprises respon-
sibility, freedom, reason, consciousness, language and similar 
attributions, all of which cannot be lost. Moreover, both Brunner and 
Barth considered self-transcendence inseparable from Imago Dei’s 
human constitution.  
Barth believed Imago Dei identified the human being as God’s 
counterpart.40 Beginning with God rather than human qualities and 
functions, he posits the ‘divine call’ addresses both ‘I and Thou’ by ref-
erencing “Let us make man in our image”.41 Thus, this ‘I-Thou’ con-
frontation within the Godhead, provides context for the creation of 
human beings. In fact, our nature appears fundamentally rooted in re-
lationships with others. Barth wrote “… Man is the repetition of the 
divine form of life; its copy and reflection… in fact, the counterpart of 
God, the encounter and discovery in God Himself being copied and 
imitated in God’s relation to man”.42 
Imago Dei therefore exists in the context of man’s relationship with 
God. For Barth, another facet of Imago Dei concerns man’s connection 
to the other. This is to say man reiterates the divine form of life: “God 
lives in togetherness with Himself, God lives in togetherness with man 
36  Lidums, “The Doctrine of Imago Dei”, p. 109.
37  Brunner, The Christian Doctrine, p. 57.
38  Brunner, Man in Revolt, p. 93. 
39  Another aspect of Imago Dei is the material sense, which is identical to ‘being-in-
the-word’ of God. This happens when man is ‘in Christ’ who is the ‘Word of God’ (Logos) 
or, in this instance, where Christ is the true image of God. Man is required to respond to 
God and if he does not answer correctly he loses his divine image but it is justly restored 
through Jesus (Brunner, man in revolt, p. 102). 
40  Herzfeld, “Imago Dei/Imago Hominis”, p. 47.
41  Barth and Bromiley, Church Dogmatics, vol. 3, p. 192; Gen 1: 26.
42  Barth and Bromiley, Church Dogmatics, Vol. 3, p. 2 and p. 82. 
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and man lives in togetherness with one another”.43 As such, humans 
also confront each other as both ‘I’ and/or ‘Thou’.44 Barth deemed the 
togetherness of God with man optimally manifest by Christ.45 Also for 
Barth, God is entirely other to humanity and therefore created man to 
enter into a relationship with a being totally different from Himself 
(deity). Thus, humans are real partners and at the same time answerable 
to God.46 
Barth says that God’s calling to His ‘Self’ implies the presence of 
a being capable of responding; hence, both Caller and called are within 
Him. However, post-creation man is entirely separate from God and as 
such, is potentially God’s counterpart. The key point in this schema is 
that humans do not exist as solitary individuals but live in confrontation 
within other human-to-human and human-to-God relationships. If no 
humans existed, there would therefore be no complete form of God be-
cause having form depends on two components: an Original and its 
copy.47 
[I]t [the image of God] is not a quality of man. Hence, there is no point in asking 
in which of man’s peculiar attributes and attitudes it consists. It does not consist 
in anything that man is or does. It consists as his self consists, as do the creatures 
of God. He would not be a man if he were not the image of God.48  
Barth emphasized that God’s divinity is relational and thereby 
joined to creation, after which it manifests. In fact, being human for 
Bath, as the ‘other’ before God, is only actualized by relationship with 
God just as being human is actualized by relationships with other hu-
mans. Barth’s final argument proposes that the purpose of mankind’s 
creation is to have fellowship with God49 as “The existence of I and 
43  Barth and Bromiley, Church Dogmatics, Vol. 3, p. 2 and p. 82.
44  For Barth, the creation of humanity includes male and female, a principle that cou-
ples relationship with differentiation. Humans are intended for relationships, to stand in 
confrontation to others, being both similar and dissimilar to them (Barth, Church Dogmat-
ics, vol. 3, p. 185).
45  Barth, The Humanity of God, p. 49. 
46  Barth, Table Talk, p. 57.
47  Some scholars interpret Barth in such a way that man’s being in the form of God is 
not a structural capacity by which man has relationship with God but that actually “exists 
first in our relationship to God” (Herzfeld 1999, p. 42). Others explain his theory of Imago 
Dei as a capacity for relationships with both God and other humans (Lidums, “The doctrine 
of Imago Dei”, p. 115).
48  Barth and Bromiley, Church Dogmatics, Vol. 3, p. 16.
49  Mueller, “What it means to be created in the image of God”, p. 20.
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Thou in confrontation”.50 Hence, the primary meaning and purpose of 
Imago Dei is man’s ability to enter into relationship.  
Pannenberg developed Biblical and Anthropological positions, writ-
ing “Jesus is the New Adam, the second heavenly man, the life-giving 
Spirit in contrast to the first earthly man… He [Jesus] is the prototype 
of reconciled humanity. Therefore, Jesus is man’s representative before 
God”.51 He positions man (1970) as the sole creature capable of dealing 
with the question of identity and exclusively so due to an attribution 
he called ‘openness to the world’. This openness is a foundation that 
led him to two other human characteristics, ‘relationship-with’ and 
‘governance-of’ the world.52 Pannenberg writes “Man’s infinite de-
pendence on an unknown being before who he stands has turned out 
to be the core of the somewhat vague expression ‘open to the world”.53 
He therefore considers man a fundamentally relational being. Another 
side of being human is self-centeredness. Hence, being ‘open to the 
world’ and ‘self-centeredness’ conflict within the ego and the unity 
through which both are united lies outside of man. This implies that 
the solution is solely grounded in God who overcomes the conflict. 
Pannenberg’s paradigmatic view of man as a relational being therefore 
justified man’s dominion over the world as God’s representative.54 
50  Barth and Bromiley, Church Dogmatics, Vol. 3, p. 185.
51  Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man, pp. 196-197. Pannenberg considered Jesus the 
second Adam, God’s representative on earth to rule over nature: ‘The totality of the material 
world does not possess its unity in itself apart from man, but this unity is only structured 
through man. The cosmos is not in itself a unity, as the majority of ancient Greek thinkers 
held, which is given prior to man and merely copied in him as a microcosm. Rather, the 
multiplicity of things in nature is first united to form the world through man. By means of 
thought and technical skill, man rules the multiplicity of cosmic events and makes of them 
his world. 
52  Lidums, “The Doctrine of Imago Dei”, p. 93.
53  Pannenberg, What is Man, p. 11. “While the needs of animals are limited to their 
environment, man’s needs know no boundary. Man is dependent not just on particular con-
ditions of his surroundings but beyond that, on something that escapes him as often as he 
reaches for fulfillment. Man’s chronic need, his infinite dependence, presupposes some-
thing outside himself that is beyond every experience of that world. In his infinite depend-
ence he presupposes with every breath he takes a corresponding, infinite, never ending, 
otherworldly being before whom he stands, even if he does not know what to call it. Man’s 
infinite dependence on an unknown being, before whom he stands, has turned out to be 
the core of the somewhat vague expression ‘open to the world” (Pannenberg, What is Man, 
pp. 10-11). 
54  Pannenberg, What is Man, p. 11.
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Man Pushes beyond everything he meets in the world and he is not completely 
and finally satisfied by anything. However, would that not mean an ascetic turn-
ing away from the world rather than openness for it? One might easily think so. 
The fact is, however, man’s communion with God directs him back into the 
world. In any case, this is the thought involved in the biblical idea of man as the 
image of God. Man’s destiny for God manifests itself in his dominion over the 
world as the representative of God’s dominion over the world.55 
 
 
2.3. Functional  
 
Pannenberg’s ‘openness to the world’ led him to human relation-
ships and mankind’s dominion over the world as components of Imago 
Dei. He considered man a fundamentally relational being and empha-
sized man’s relationship to God as an essential prerequisite for any pro-
prietary approach to man’s dominion over the world. To compliment 
this concept, additional aspects such as form and function were also 
recognized,56 with the latter’s dualism as ontological and existential, 
respectively beginning with God as form and function.57 Both are so 
intertwined that one can only understand Imago Dei in light of their 
inseparability.58 Nevertheless, this togetherness is metaphysical rather 
than physical, comprising divine authorization to govern as God’s rep-
resentative:59 “The image and likeness of God consists essentially in 
one’s sharing the domain of God”.60 Johnannes Hehn first drew atten-
tion to this dynamic as the primary function implicit in Imago Dei. Al-
though important, being God’s representative, as a concomitant with 
being in the image of God, does not, however, constitute the actual of-
fice. Here is where Hehn refers to extra-Biblical sources to suggest an 
understanding of Imago Dei as ‘royal’ — i.e., as a designation rather 
than attribution of human nature.61 
55  Pannenberg, What is Man, p. 14. 
56  Mueller, “What it means to be created in the image of God”, p. 19. 
57  Clines, “The Image of God in Man”, p. 101.
58  Schmidt writes “In the old Testament, wherever human being is, God is proclaimed. 
The person represents, attests, ‘God on the earth’. So the person as such, created by God, 
is God’s witness… it is of the nature of an image to allow what it represents to appear: so 
where the person appears, God also appears” (Schmidt, Die Schöpfungsgeschichte der 
Priesterschrift, p. 144: quoted in Mueller, What it means, p. 20). 
59  Mueller, What it means, p. 20.
60  Gross, “Die Gottebenbildlichkeit des Menschen.” cited in Mueller, What it means, p. 12.
61  Hehn, “Zum Terminus ‘Bild Gottes’”, quoted in Herzfeld, “Imago Dei” p. 33. 
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Von Rad (1962)62 believed chaos threatens creation and human 
kind. For this reason, God created and called humans to impose order 
on nature and participate in God’s plan of salvation, as nature was cre-
ated with reference to mankind.63 He therefore considered man’s sig-
nificant role in the universe as central to being in the form of God. 
What therefore reveals Imago Dei is man’s functional capacity to join 
God in a developmental capacity to establish and maintain order in the 
universe. 
The divine likeness consists in the fact that man was invested with might at cre-
ation. There is no other evidence in the OT as to the proper interpretation of di-
vine likeness… In Genesis 1: 26 we are told man was to be created in the divine 
image that he may control the whole of creation. This is expressed very strongly 
in ‘P’, who argues that creation is referred to man and requires his dominion as 
a principle of ordering.64 
Thus, the functional approach to Imago Dei concerns the human 
capacity to exercise duties as God’s deputy on earth. This interpretation 
considers the whole of man physically and intellectually, which means 
Imago Dei can be interpreted as the extent to which a human being re-
sponds and functions on earth as God’s vicegerent and image. This 
markedly functional interpretation is far more comprehensive than the 
substantive because it embraces a holistic view of humanity’s essence; 
specifically, creation in God’s image was immediately followed by the 
divine commission to exercise dominion. This approach supports moral 
responsibility and attitudes, especially towards community and envi-




62  Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, p. 144. Gerhard von Rad extended Hehn’s 
work as a functional approach to Imago Dei. He rejected substantive views, especially 
those that interpreted the image of God based on mental or spiritual aspects or human 
capacity (Kittel, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, p. 392). Von Rad believed 
any debate over the substantive approach was futile and argued there was no evidence 
in the OT to indicate a proper interpretation of divine likeness except in Genesis, where 
it robustly expressed creation’s need for man’s dominion (Von Rad, Old Testament,  
p. 145).
63  Von Rad, Old Testament, p. 144.
64  Von Rad, “Divine Likeness in the OT”, vol. 1, pp. 391-392. 
65  Kittel, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, p. 392.
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3. Attitudes of Islamic Scholars Regarding Imago Dei 
 
Sufis offer significant interpretations of Imago Dei, including Shi-
blī66 and Ghazzālī.67 Ghazzālī reported a ḥadīth from Shiblī who dis-
cussed Imago Dei and said Adam was created in view of the divine 
names but the Essence of God had been forever hidden.68 According 
to Shiblī, Adam was created in the form of God’s names and attributes, 
not His Essence. Sufi theologians who followed further developed this 
new distinction between divine names and essence.  
Ḥallāj gave the motif a symbolic theme by assigning Adam as nāsūt 
or ‘transcendence of God’. Thus, Adam became the Godhead clothed 
in humanity.69 Rūzbihān Baqlī explained the idea by saying that when 
God looks at a thing He makes in it an image of Himself, such that the 
image remains eternal. Therefore, when God manifests Himself eter-
nally to a human (shakhṣ), He becomes identical with that person and 
specifies attributions similar to His own. That same individual then 
causes those attributions to visibly manifest via activities. Thus, God 
manifests Himself both ‘in him’ and ‘from him:70 
Then God wanted to make these attributes appear [starting] from Love in sepa-
rateness (infirād) so that He could see them and speak to them. He looked at pre-
eternity and created an image, which is His image and His Essence, because if 
66  Shaykh Abu Bakr Shiblī (861-946): Important Sufi of Persian descent. Disciple of 
Junayd al-Baghdādī.
67  Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al Ghazzālī (1058-1111). Al-Ghazzālī, 
known as Algazelus or Algazel in the Western medieval world, was a Persian theologian, 
jurist, philosopher and mystic. Some historians refer to him as the single most influential 
Muslim after Muḥammad. See: Ghazali, al. The Columbia Encyclopedia, https://www.bri-
tannica.com/biography/al-Ghazali (consulted on 17 Dec 2012); Adamec, Historical Dic-
tionary of Islam, p. 110; Watt, The Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazali, p. 11.
68  Ghazzālī, Kītāb al-Imlāʾ, vol. 5, p. 32. Ghazzālī used the ḥadith ‘God created man 
in His form’ in his book, Iḥyā᾿ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn, to explain the human heart: “the heart is a 
mystery from the world of divine command (Amr = رمألا) … and all parts of the universe 
belong to it. It is the same mystery about which God said ‘Say: The spirit (cometh) by 
command of my Lord’ [Qurʾān 17: 85] and this mystery is king because it comes from the 
world of the divine command. There is a hierarchy through which the world of the divine 
command and the world of creation are connected to each other. Therefore, someone who 
perceives the meaning of that will also understand the meaning of his soul, and someone 
who knows his soul knows his Lord, and in such a way the Prophet’s statement, ‘God cre-
ated man in His form’ would be meaningful” (Ghazzālī, Iḥyā᾿ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn, ed. A.B. B.H. 
Ḥāfiz Irāqī, nd, Beirut, Dār Al-Kitāb Al-‘Arabī, vol. 1, p. 184). 
69  Masataka, Ibn ‘Arabī’s theory of the perfect man, p. 20.
70  Baqlī Shīrāzi, Shathīyāt, pp. 433-444.
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God looks at a thing, He makes in it an image from Him, and that image will re-
main through eternity, and in that image will remain Knowledge, Power, Move-
ment, Will and all [His] Attributes through eternity. When He manifests Himself 
eternally to a person (shakhṣ) He becomes identical (huwa huwa) with him, and 
He looks at that [person] for an aeon (dahr) of His eternity… He specifies certain 
attributions in him similar to His own, attributes which He created form the 
meaning of the manifestation (ẓuhūr) in that person whom He had created in His 
own image. Thus, he [that person] becomes both creator (khāliq) and nourisher 
(rāziq) who praises and glorifies and makes these attributions and actions visible. 
In like manner, He made substances and wonders visible and brought that person 
into His kingdom and manifested Himself in him and from him.71 
Although Ḥallāj mentions the creation of an image or person, he does 
not stipulate Adam or mankind. Hence, the image or person can be in-
terpreted as intellect, spirit or concrete existence, as it is not specified. 
Ghazzālī expounds his theories on Imago Dei in different books and 
places, in both theological and philosophical contexts. In Iḥyā᾿ he states 
that communication between God and man takes place within the 
human spirit because God breathed His spirit into man and that such 
interaction concerns a mystical union with God.72 He stresses that com-
mon attributions between God and man do not exist73 but rather that 
one can be nearer to God by imitating His attributes by imitating an-
gels. He stated that what characterizes living comprises perception and 
action, which are liable to deficiencies and mediocrity but open to per-
fection. The more you imitate angels in these characteristics, the further 
you leave behind animal qualities and draw nearer to angelic likeness. 
Since angels are near to God, one who is near to angels is near to God.74 
Ghazzālī also concluded that man’s being in the form of God indicates 
his being in the form of The Most Merciful,75 which is the most com-
prehensive name of God76 since it includes all divine names as taught 
to Adam by God. At the same time he writes that the image of God 
(Allāh) and the image of The Most Merciful are different, although man 
can be in the image of The Most Merciful: 
71  Baqlī Shīrāzi, Shathīyāt, Translation taken from the Persian version: Rūzbihān 
Baqlī, Sharḥ, pp. 433-444, which corresponds to the Arabic version in Daylamī, A treatise 
on mystical love, pp. 27-28.
72  Ghazzālī, Kītāb al-Imlāʾ, vol. 5, pp. 34-38.
73  Ghazzālī, al-Maqṣad, pp. 49-50.
74  Ghazzālī, al-Maqṣad, p. 46. 
75  Ghazzālī, Mishkāt, pp. 70-71.
76  Masakata, Ibn ‘Arabī’s theory of the perfect man, p. 44. 
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Maybe one sees such a mystic and applies to him the saying, “God created Adam 
in the image of the Merciful One.” However, if one contemplates it attentively, 
one knows that this saying has an interpretation (taʾwīl) just like the saying, “I 
am God” or “Glory to me” and also like God’s words to Moses, “I became sick 
and you did not visit me,” and “I become his hearing, his sight, and his tongue.” 
But now I must stop the explanation here.77 
Ghazzālī influenced the mystic and philosopher Ibn ‘Arabī,78 who men-
tions three levels of manifestation in Futūḥāt: outer (ẓāhir), inner (bāṭīn) 
and intermediate, the latter being the human who possesses both inner and 
outer forms.79 In Fuṣūṣ he says that because of both forms humans have 
the real form of God.80 Ibn ʻArabī posits that God manifests Himself in 
the human heart, for which reason the human heart has the form of God.81 
But at the same time he warns there is no real definition of the heart.82 
William Chittick, a contemporary commentator, took extraordinary 
steps to explain Ibn ‘Arabī’s theories. He suggests that being in the 
form of God identifies man with the all-comprehensive Name of God, 
which therefore gives meaning to divine Essence and Attributes.83 
Thus, form is everything manifest and everything perceived, implying 
the universe is an immeasurable collection of forms and, although 
everything is a form of God, man is the most complete form.84 
Whatever the situation of anything in the cosmos, it is the form of the Real be-
cause of what He has given to it, for it is not correct for anything in the cosmos 
to have a wujūd that is not the form of the Real.85 
77  Ghazzālī, Mishkāt, p. 61, cited in Masataka, Ibn ‘Arabī’s theory of the perfect man, 
p. 41. 
78  Afīfī, The Mystical Philosophy, p. xi, and p. xii. Afīfī holds that Ibn ‘Arabī qualifies 
as a mystical philosopher. That is, one who assumes tension toward the transcendent divine 
ground of being as the fundamental attribute of human reality per se, and then explores 
the entire hierarchy of being from this decisive perspective. See Ellis Sandoz, “What is a 
mystic philosopher and why does it matter? Preliminary Reflections.” Paper, Eric Voegelin 
Society, 27th Annual International Meeting, Seattle, Washington (Sep), 2011, p. 3.
79  Ibn ‘Arabī, Fūtuḥāt, vol. 2, p. 319.
80  Ibn ʻArabī, Fuṣūṣ, p. 56. Ibn ‘Arabī writes that this ḥadīth refers to the Prophet who 
said ‘God created man in His form or ṣura’ (Futūḥāt, vol. 1, p. 200(. Ibn ‘Arabī mentions 
this many times in Futūḥāt; e.g., vol. 2, p. 391 and p. 170. See: Watt, “Created in His 
image: a study in Islamic theology”, p. 7.
81  Ibn ‘Arabī, Fūtuḥāt, vol.1, p. 416.
82  Ibn ‘Arabī, Fūtuḥāt, vol.1, p. 573.
83  Chittick, Ibn ‘Arabī, p. 74.
84  Chittick, The Self-disclosure of God, p. 27.
85  Ibn ʻArabī, Futūḥāt, vol.3, p. 409; Chittick, The Self-disclosure of God, p. 27. 
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The Qurʾān states “… and He taught Adam the names of all 
things”86 which includes all of God’s names as well as those of creation. 
This implies that Adam learned all forms of what is real from God and 
that the knowing of these forms cannot be disassociated from Adam’s 
existence because God’s knowledge is not separate from God’s exis-
tence.87 However, Chittick emphasizes that all people do not hold this 
‘knowing’ equally; hence, mankind is divided into categories reflecting 
higher and lower levels of this knowledge.  
ʻAfīfī writes that Ibn ʻArabī introduced human beings as logos by 
using concepts such as Real, Adam, Pole, Spirit and Vicegerent. More-
over, he says Ibn ʻArabī’s ‘Perfect Man’ is the optimal manifestation 
of God as ‘perfect existence’88 and that his Principle of Universal Rea-
son is immanent in everything, extraordinarily so in humans who 
thereby merit the vicegerency of God as His image for the specific pur-
pose of manifesting God’s attributions. Henry Corbin calls man theo-
phanic or actual shining of God, which radiates via human form in 
union with God’s ‘imaginative presence’ to mirror divinity. This divine 
presence resides within man’s consciousness as a divinely placed theo-
phanic image within humans.89 
Nasr contends that Ibn ‘Arabī formulated the Logos as the complete 
manifestation of God’s names with man as prototype of the universe. This 
is to say, that because of the Logos, man includes all extant possibilities 
within the universe. Thus, macrocosm (the universe) and microcosm 
(man) are two mirrors reflecting each other even as both reflect the com-
mon prototype, which is the universal man as the universal spirit or First 
Intellect.90 Izutsu posits that Ibn ʻArabī depicted two levels of the Perfect 
Man. The first is as a species or perfect existence in the image of God, 
constituting a complete abstract and spirit of the universe as microcosm. 
The second concerns men as unequal individuals with a few deserving 
the attribution of ‘perfection’ while most remain at the animal level.91 
This classification of approaches to the interpretation of Imago Dei 
aids our understanding of philosophical, cosmological, theological and 
86  Qurʾān 2: 31.
87  Chittick, Ibn ʻArabī, p. 75. 
88  ʻAfīfī, The Mystical Philosophy, p. 67.
89  Corbin, Alone with the Alone, p. 275.
90  Nasr, Three Muslim Sages, p. 110.
91  Izutsu, A Comparative Study of the Key Philosophical, vol. 2, p. 218.
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mystical contexts within which the theory’s constructs are embedded. 
We now attempt to map substantive, functional and relational ap-
proaches as found in Ibn ‘Arabī’s treatises and thereafter discuss the 
relational approach as a subject of controversy.  
 
 
4. Substantive, Functional and Relational Approaches to Imago Dei 
Found in Ibn ‘Arabī’s Perspective 
 
4.1. Ibn ʻArabī and a General Conception of Imago Dei92 
 
The Judeo-Christian tradition on Imago Dei is based on two atti-
tudes: one being theoretical and interpretative, which relates to the idea 
that God created all human beings in His image. This concept refers to 
the creation of Adam and generalizes that Adam’s features were be-
queathed to all humans. The second attitude relates to the actualization 
of a complete prototypical image of God, which in Christianity is 
Christ. Ibn ‘Arabī applied this Judeo-Christian paradigm but also in-
troduced the concept of the Perfect Man as an actual prototype of 
Imago Dei. He attempted thereby to depict an image of the Perfect Man 
as an amalgamation or complete divine ‘image’, since God is the only 
perfect being. In doing so, Ibn ʻArabī’s anthropological approach dif-
ferentiates the Perfect Man from animal man.  
The Perfect Man had already been explained both in Greek philos-
ophy93 and the Islamic tradition prior to Ibn ʻArabī’s dissertation.94 Ibn 
‘Arabī (1946) referred to the completion of his ideas on the Perfect 
Man in the initial chapter of Fuṣūṣ (Chapter ‘Adam’).95 He associates 
his Perfect Man with Adam’s creation but not with all aspects of a com-
 
 
93  Zaehner, The Teaching of the Magi, p. 76.
94  Badawī, Muwsū‘at, p. 35.
95  The Perfect Man is the most complete creature and possesses all the divine names. 
Through him, God sees the universe and sees His names. �Based on Ibn ‘Arabī ‘s theory, 
all human beings are divided into two groups: Perfect Men and animal men. He features 
of the Perfect Man include the divine names and attributes such as life, knowledge, free 
will, power and others. However, he says the most important feature of the Perfect Man is 
knowledge and that men with other features are not necessarily perfect (Fuṣūṣ, pp. 50-61).
272 SAEIDEH SAYARI, MOHD ZUFRI BIN MAMAT, MAISARAH BINT HASBULLAH






Alcantara  Vol XLI-1 (008)-2.qxp_Maquetación 1  26/8/20  13:24  Página 272
plete existence as perfect but rather as having priority over other beings 
in the knowing of God’s importance. Thus, he connects knowing God 
with the divine form, meaning that to the extent man knows himself as 
being in the form of God he is complete at some level of existence, im-
plying that knowledge is crucial to actually being in the divine form. 
Consequently, the most important attribution placed within humans is 
knowledge of God as expressed in several passages of Ibn ‘Arabī’s 
texts. In fact, the knowledge of God is knowledge of His names and 
attributions, and since His names are the things of the universe, knowl-
edge of God implies knowledge of the universe, which includes human 
beings.96  
Adam is thus an all-inclusive being or synthesis (Jamʻīya) of all 
things. And as God sees Himself as an inclusive being (kawn jāmiʻ),97 
Adam is thus considered a synthesis of both the image of God and the 
universe.98 Referring to two components (physical and spiritual), God 
said “I created Adam by my two hands”.99 Ibn ‘Arabī interprets God’s 
hands as two forms, that of God and that of the universe. Adam’s 
vicegerency thus comprises two contrasting forms implying human 
‘being’ is an assembly of opposites and that he is not God’s represen-
tative without them and furthermore, that he cannot interact with the 
universe without the form of the universe or that of God.100 
Going a step further, Ibn ‘Arabī says these forms are outward and 
inward, the former being that of the universe and the latter being that 
of God, the Real (Ḥaqq).101 Based on this view, God created the human 
‘self’ in His image (form). Sight and hearing are related to the inner 
aspect (bātin) of the human self.102 Referring to “being his sight and 
hearing’, ʻArabī explains this is why God did not refer to physical eyes 
and ears but to hearing and his sight. ‘When I have fashioned him 
(indue proportion) and breathed into him of my spirit, fall ye down in 




98  Ibn ‘Arabī, Fuṣūṣ, p. 48.
99  Qur᾿ān 38: 75.
100  Ibn ‘Arabī, Fuṣūṣ, p. 55.
101  Ibn ‘Arabī, Fuṣūṣ, p. 56.
102  Ibn ‘Arabī, Fuṣūṣ, p. 55.
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obeisance unto him”.103 Thus, humans see and hear through the spirit 
God breathed into him and this spirit is the inner aspect that obtains 
understanding. In other words, human beings understand via the image 
of God or divine form. Ibn ʻArabī reiterates that all creatures are in 
God’s form according to the respective capacities but the complete 
form is reserved only for the Perfect Man as God’s vicegerent.104 
God therefore manifests in man in two aspects, outer (ẓāhir) and 
inner (bāṭīn). Since man has both he can potentially disclose inner and 
outer manifestations. Hence, both inner divine form and outer divine 
form105 comprise the real form of God,106 which must possess features 
bestowed by God. 
 
 
4.2. The Substantive Approach 
 
Although Ibn ‘Arabī is known as a mystic he also has a philosoph-
ical system, which foundation declares that God is the only existence 
or ‘Being’. Ibn ‘Arabī’s philosophical paradigm is comparable to the 
Platonic despite Aristotle’s influence, especially regarding human fac-
ulties. Jane Clark says the terms ‘potential’ and ‘fulfillment’ (actual-
ization and completion) began with Aristotle,107 who established his 
physics on notions such as movement and the translation of potentiality 
into actuality. Moving from physics to psychology, Aristotle applied 
the same terms and models he used in physics and said the soul is the 
first entelechy or actualized state of potentiality as living organisms.108 
These concepts of Plato and Aristotle greatly affected Judeo-Chris-
tian tradition and Islamic thought. However, unlike other Islamic schol-
ars who placed reason and intellect as supreme human faculties, Ibn 
‘Arabī criticized this prioritization of reason by claiming that man has 
a superior faculty or place in which he receives God’s revelation (ta-
jallī). He conceives this vessel as the heart, in and through which man 
receives knowledge and calls the process ‘taste’ (dhawq) and ‘unveil-
103  Qurʾān 15: 29.
104  Ibn ‘Arabī, Fuṣūṣ, p. 55.
105  Ibn ‘Arabī, Futūḥāt, vol. 2, p. 319.
106  Ibn ‘Arabī, Fuṣūṣ, p. 56.
107  Clark, “Fulfilling our Potential”, p. 4.
108  Clark, “Fulfilling our Potential”, p. 6.
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ing’ (kashf).109 Nonetheless, Ibn Arabī validates reason as a faculty be-
stowed by God. William Chittick (1989) writes that reason is a funda-
mental power of human ‘self’, a faculty called ‘aql in spiritual beings, 
although such beings are themselves ‘aql; hence, the term can be trans-
lated as ‘intellect’. Chittick continues “by its nature reason perceives 
(idrāk), whether through an inherent, intuitive knowledge that needs 
nothing from outside, or through various instruments such as the five 
senses and ‘reflective consideration’ (naẓar fikrī)”.110 Ibn ‘Arabī con-
sidered all such faculties instruments of the heart and made no distinc-
tion between intellect and heart. He stresses that man cannot know God 
as deity without also knowing creation111 and that man applies his fac-
ulty of reason to know creation.  
This divinely endowed capacity is therefore actualized through the 
human heart as the image of God and is fundamental to human 
‘being’.112 Moreover, its actualization happens via the reception of di-
vine knowledge within this locus (the human heart). Knowledge re-
ceived by the heart flows through intellect, imagination and the senses, 
inclusive of all human faculties.113 Ibn ‘Arabī wrote: 
… After making Adam’s clay, God said, ‘I have created him by my hands’,114 
then God put into Adam everything that He put into angels as deposit and said 
‘I am about to create man from clay’,115 and deposits that you (angles) brought, 
will be from you in him. When I have fashioned him (in due proportion) and 
breathed into him of my spirit, fall ye down in obeisance unto him’.116 
In another book, Ibn ‘Arabī writes that God taught Adam all the 
names and instructed him to teach them to all creatures, including 
the angels.117 God also placed all the qualities of animals within man 
109  Clark, “Fulfilling our Potential”, p. 6.
110  Chittick, The Sufi Path, p. 159.
111  Ibn ‘Arabī, Fuṣūṣ, p. 81.
112  Clark, “Fulfilling our Potential”, p. 6.
113  Clark, “Fulfilling our Potential”, p. 3.
114  Qurʾān 38: 75.
115  Qurʾān 38: 71.






Ibn ‘Arabī, Al- Insān, p. 7.
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but added a special faculty through which man perceives, knows, 
sees, hears and lives. Hence, God created man as a perceiving 
being.118 He explained that God placed knowledge in man to justify 
and acknowledge God’s knowledge. Similarly also, he placed the 
other attributes and names, including speech, hearing, life, etc.119 Ibn 
‘Arabī demonstrated that human beings know God because God im-
planted the faculty of reasoning, understanding and knowledge 
within them and that men could not know God or His knowledge 
without these faculties. Accordingly, man has a God-given faculty 
(power) of recognition via reason and intellect (‘aql),120 so that man 
perceives all types of knowledge, even that which is intuitive. Ibn 
‘Arabī considered this capacity for reason and intellect the ‘heart’ 
or ‘spirit’.121 Moreover, the spirit (‘aql) represents all such knowl-
edge placed by God within man.122 
Chittick (1989) claims that man in divine form is both infinite and 
unique, since all possibilities in divine form are infinite. Therefore, hu-
mans can potentially reflect on all possibilities of existence.123 Thus, 
man in divine form, including all possibilities of existence plus the di-
vine law that orders man to position everything in its rightful position 
(adab), was introduced as God’s representative on earth to rule over 
all other creatures. Referring to the Perfect Man, Ibn ‘Arabī argues jus-
tifications for all human beings as God’s caliphs at differing levels be-
cause of the inherent divine form, although the Perfect Man solely 
actualizes all features as God’s optimal representative. 
 
 
4.3. The Functional Approach  
 
Ibn ‘Arabī says that if humans did not have all the names and at-
tributes of God they could not be God’s vicegerent on earth. In Fuṣūṣ 
118  Ibn ‘Arabī, Futūḥāt, vol. 1, p. 124.




121  Ibn ‘Arabī, Futūḥāt, vol. 1, p. 564.
122  Ibn ‘Arabī, Futūḥāt, vol. 1. P. 565.
123  Ibn ‘Arabī, Futūḥāt, vol. 1, p. 124; Chittick, The Sufi Path, p. 275.
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he insists that God refers to the dignity of man, whom He created with 
His two hands:124 i.e., the divine form and the form of the universe. He 
then writes that the vicegerent must be capable of manifesting all re-
quirements as God’s servant because man has all qualities of the God-
head125 (Chittick, 1989) and because God protects his creatures through 
man.126 
So it was the divine decree to polish the universe, so Adam was the best polished 
mirror of the universe. He was the spirit of that form (universe)… This being 
was then called human being (insān) and caliph. As for humanness, it comes 
from the universality of his organism and his ability to embrace all realities. He 
is the locus of the seal and thus, the token with which the king places the seal on 
his treasures.127 
Thus, being in the form of God means to have the attributes and 
names of God, which also means to be God’s vicegerent on earth. God 
says “I will create a vicegerent on earth”.128 In Fuṣūṣ, Ibn ‘Arabī cites 
this motif and explains that vicegerency indicates dominion over all 
creatures. Moreover, God did not give Himself any name unless He 
taught it to man, implying the same name appears in the universe via 
man. In this way he interprets the well-known ḥadīth “God created man 
in His image”.129 Ibn ‘Arabī believes that only a Perfect Man who man-
ifests all the names actualizes the vicegerency of God. He posits that 
other creatures manifest some names according to their respective ca-
pacities, their domains of vicegerency being limited to those names. 
Hence, every human being is accordingly so disposed, at least in his 
or her body.130 
Since the servitude means formlessness or nothingness and 
vicegerency implies all forms and names and attributions of God, 
Chittick describes servitude as the embodiment of God’s incompara-
124  Qurʾān 38: 75.
125  Chittick, The Sufi Path, p. 175.




128  Qur᾿ān, 2: 30.
129  Ibn ‘Arabī, Fuṣūṣ, p. 50. 
130  Ibn ‘Arabī, Futūḥāt, vol. 2, p. 272.
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bility and vicegerency as God’s similarity.131 At the same time he em-
phasizes that incomparability logically precedes similarity.132 
Ibn ‘Arabī writes that God gave authority to man for three reasons: 
He created man with His two hands; He taught him all the names; and 
then officially announced that He placed Adam as His vicegerent on 
earth.133 When Adam taught the names to the angels, they immediately 
realized that he was God’s representative.134 Since God bestowed 
vicegerency on Adam and his children, two aspects of the vicegerency 
can be classified: (1) comprehensiveness, which Ibn ‘Arabī says be-
longs to the genus of man and not just Adam,135 meaning this 
vicegerency includes all human beings; and (2) different levels of au-
thority relating to respective capacities as God’s caliphs, ranging from 
governing their bodies at the lowest level to mastery over all creatures 
at the highest level.136 
There is no being more complete than the Perfect Man and those who have not 
completed this end in life are rational animals, a component of the Perfect Man 
but nothing more. This estate does not earn the degree of humanity and is more 
like a dead body for the living human. A rational animal has the form of a human 
being but is not a true human being. This is because a dead body concretely lacks 
the entire scope of faculties. Hence, such is the case with a person who has not 
completed his perfection, which is vicegerency. He is not caliph if he does not 
possess the divine names via the deserving manner.137 
131  Comparing substantive and functional approaches, Chittick writes that the substan-
tive approach precedes the functional. According to the substantive approach, God taught 
the human being His names or faculties through which man was given divine form. Since 
divine form includes all forms of creation, and since forms of creation are infinite, human 
beings are therefore infinite. In fact, they do not have any especial form since they are 
formless, like God (Chittick, Imaginal Worlds). Chittick then associates this formlessness 
with vicegerency, which means to have all forms. He explains that nothingness means 
being God’s servant, implying the abandonment of all human attributes and returning 
everything positive and good to the rightful owner: God, the Real (Chittick, Imaginal 
Worlds, p. 170).
132  Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, p. 170. 
133  Ibn ‘Arabī, Futūḥāt, vol. 2, p. 441. 
134  Ibn ‘Arabī, Futūḥāt, vol. 3, p. 400.
135  Ibn ‘Arabī, Futūḥāt, vol. 1, p. 137.





(Ibn ‘Arabī, Futūḥāt, vol. 2, p. 2 and p. 44).
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Moreover: 
Since God created man in His form, the vicegerent must present himself in that 
form, otherwise he is not vicegerent. Man is called as caliph by God and pos-
sesses the power to govern all creatures.138 
God therefore sees Himself in the essence of His caliph as the best 
and most complete form; hence, the caliph cannot exist unless he exists 
in the power and form of God.139 
God created man in His form and His form is not but His presence 
and ‘form’ here is actually God’s presence.140 To be the image of this form 
it is therefore necessary for the vicegerent of God to imitate the names of 
the Being who appointed him vicegerent.141 Hence, God’s presence en-
compasses the imitation of His names, which includes His Essence, Ac-
tions and Attributes. Moreover, the presence of His Essence in creatures 
is solely possible through names that cannot be separated from God’s 
Essence. Therefore, God’s presence in the human being as His caliph 
manifests by having His form, which is the exercise of His actions and 
attributes by imitating His names. Ibn ‘Arabī thus views man as (1) a mi-
crocosm based on man’s inner nature (fīțrah), including all forms within 
the universe; and (2) man as possessor of all divine names.142 These are 
the two hands of God, whose features provide man’s vicegerency. 
Von Rad believes God called man to join Him in the imposition of 
order in nature but Ibn ‘Arabī says God called man to manage and con-
trol all things as His representative rather than assistant. Hence, man 
does not join God since man, especially the Perfect Man, has complete 
authority to govern all things. Some scholars believe that being God’s 
representative is concomitant with being in God’s image but that it does 
not constitute the image. However, Ibn ‘Arabī mutually connects Imago 
Dei with vicegerency.143 He interprets being ‘in the form’ of God pre-
138  Ibn ‘Arabī, Futūḥāt, vol. 1, p. 263. 
139  Ibn ‘Arabī, Futūḥāt, vol. 1, p. 263. 
140  Ibn ‘Arabī, Fuṣūṣ, p. 199.
141  Ibn ‘Arabī, al-Tadbīrāt, p. 145.




He is the representative of the Real on God’s earth… as for the goal of the questioner; 
vicegerency means to be God’s representative over His creatures. Hence, man represents 
vicegerency through the outward [manifestation of God’s] names. God bestowed knowl-
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cisely as ‘being His vicegerent’, thus explaining vicegerency as the 
manifestation of divine form via imitation, which brings the divine 
presence as image.144 Thus, Ibn ‘Arabī’s interpretation of Imago Dei 
and vicegerency became an intimately interwoven singular concept. 
Moreover, since vicegerency requires responsibility it also demands 
existential independency in its encounter with the ‘Other’. Thus, Ibn 
‘Arabī explains how it is that man encounters God via his divine form. 
 
 
4.4. The Relational Approach 
 
Ibn ‘Arabī based his system of thought on the Oneness of Being 
and many-ness of Being’s manifestation. The functional approach to 
Imago Dei allows that God’s vicegerent requires authority to exercise 
both power and free will as God-given attributes of human ‘being’ but 
with a relational contingency that limits both. Ibn ‘Arabī the mystic as-
sumed a friendly, intimate relationship with God and via many state-
ments suggested/implied this relationship was reciprocal. He compared 
the experience of this rapport—between man and other (God)—to a 
kind of mutually active understanding. Judeo-Christian tradition de-
fines this relationship as ‘being within God’, specifically the associa-
tion in which God addresses the other (man) who is in Him. Thus, God 
is both caller and called and since God has the capacity of calling the 
other, man also, as God’s image, has the capacity to answer the other 
(God). Man can therefore choose to enter a mutual relationship that 
was divinely imparted through this ‘call-answer’/‘I-Thou’ linkage. 
Here the relationship specifically means ‘to understand’ the other. 
edge of the names on His representative in so far as He included features that invoke re-
actions. Via these reactions, He therefore intervenes in the universe (Futūḥāt 1911, vol. 2, 
p. 68).
144  In many passages, after mentioning man’s vicegerency Ibn ‘Arabī cites God’s 
teaching the divine names to man and man’s creation in the divine form (Futūḥāt 1911, 
vol. 3, p. 270; vol. 1, p. 645; vol. 3, p. 299). When God ordered Adam to teach the names 
to the angels and he taught them, they knew man was God’s representative on earth. Since 
the decree of vicegerency belongs to Adam and his children, one can classify two aspects 
of this vicegerency: (1) comprehensiveness, which Ibn ‘Arabī says is the genus of man as 
God’s caliph on earth, not just Adam. This means vicegerency includes all of human beings 
at various levels of authority. Different degrees of authority relate to various capacities of 
man as caliph, from governing their bodies (the lowest level), to mastery over all creatures 
as the Perfect Man (Futūḥāt, vol. 2, p. 441). 
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Hence, the image of God’s extrapolation implies abilities to both enter 
into relationships-with and understand others. 
Brunner believed God created man to have this special relationship 
and Ibn ‘Arabī restated this in symbolic language. Ibn ‘Arabī’s view 
holds three concepts: the mirror, the other and the Lord (Rabb). 
In Fuṣūṣ he suggests God wanted to see Himself in the mirror (al-
Mir’āt) as Adam, the other outside of Himself, especially since Adam’s 
existence manifested the pristine unity of all divine names.145 More-
over, God had created the universe but could not see a clear reflection 
because it was not polished. Since such a blurred existence could not 
represent Him He therefore created man who incorporates the universe 
but has the capacity to represent God as a polished ‘being’.146 Izutsu 
writes that man was able to manifest God because his polished being 
specifically represents consciousness. He further concluded, “only in 
the highest ‘knower’ does the spotless surface of human consciousness 
reflect the Absolute as it really is”.147 A common mirror is passive and 
reflects only the image of a thing without interaction; but man, as con-
scious being, is an active mirror that reflects via interaction and mani-
fests God’s attributions, which otherwise remain undisclosed within 
God’s Essence. The process of this manifestation happens via mutual 
understanding, which occurs via consciousness. 
As per Ibn ‘Arabī’s interpretation, God’s desire to be understood 
commanded communication with the other (man) as the goal of cre-
ation. The common locus initiates a mutual relationship that is focused 
on the divine names as medium between man and God, but solely 
within the context of human ‘being’. Hence, this relationship is with-
held from all other creatures throughout the universe, which also in-
cludes God’s names but does possess a comprehensive consciousness. 
Indeed, Ibn ‘Arabī holds that comprehensive consciousness and mutual 
self-disclosure are necessary for this relationship. 
Barth asserts the initial criterion for true encounter requires looking 
the other in the eye,148 which demands both openness to mutual self-
disclosure and recognition of the other as a distinct being. Ibn ‘Arabī’s 
notion perceives man as seeing himself in front of God exchanging 
145  Ibn ‘Arabī, Fuṣūṣ, pp. 48-49. 
146  Ibn ‘Arabī, Fuṣūṣ, pp. 49-50.
147  Izutsu, A Comparative Study, vol. 2, p. 213. 
148  Barth and Bromiley, Church Dogmatics, vol. 3, p. 250.
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both existence and actualization via the heart as venue for the relation-
ship. Early in Fuṣūṣ, Ibn ‘Arabī says God desired to see Himself re-
flected through an ‘other’ who was not Himself. Therefore, he created 
the universe with all of His names and provided for it to manifest each 
name separately. But some names (materials) were a far cry from hav-
ing any connection with Him.149 Consequently, God’s desire to see 
Himself demanded an amalgamated ‘connection’ (disclosure) of all di-
vine names through a living being. This especial creature required two 
forms, an absolute spiritual aspect (God) and an absolute material as-
pect.150 
The evidence for Ibn ‘Arabī’s relational interpretation of Imago Dei 
is manifest in prophet Muḥammad. Michel Chodkiewicz writes that, 
according to Ibn ’Arabī’s Futūḥāt, creation began with scattered dust 
motes (al-habā᾿) and that the very first thing in al-habā᾿ to be endowed 
with existence was the Muḥammadan Reality (ḥaqīqa muḥam-
madiyya), which proceeds from the divine name, al-Raḥmān (the Mer-
ciful). As such it is not confined because it is illimitable.151 The 
Muḥammadan Reality therefore serves as locus for the other in which 
God sees Himself in a completely unified form. 
Ibn ‘Arabī finalizes his description of Imago Dei with a dialogue, 
demonstrating how man’s consciousness converses with God. He uses 
a metaphor for the exchange (ḥiwār) between God and the other as dis-
course on the divine names concerning creation.152 Gerald Elmore 
(2001) quotes the dialogue and writes that Ibn ‘Arabī attempted to rep-
resent God’s desire for communication by using figurative story. The 
following example shows how relationships with others represent the 
inner features of this aspect of human ‘being’ and has some bearing on 
God’s effort. 
Humans create machines or robots that are rationally designed to 
perform the functions of men. In spite of agreements and disagreements 
over AI-based machines, demands for more complicated machines 
keep increasing. Indeed, “We are insecure in our understanding of our-
selves and this insecurity breeds a new preoccupation with the question 
of who we are. We search for ways to see ourselves. The computer is 
149  Ibn ‘Arabī, Fuṣūṣ, pp. 48-50.
150  Ibn ‘Arabī, Fuṣūṣ, p. 92.
151  Chodkiewicz, Seal of Saint, p. 69.
152  Elmore, “Four Texts of Ibn ʻArabī”, p. 14.
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a new mirror”.153 These machines therefore inform man of his ‘what-
ness’. Through such interactions man encounters himself as they pro-
vide knowledge of his capacities, feelings, emotions, hopes and latent 
features. Man thus attempts to know himself from outside of himself 
through a conscious agent that reflects his capabilities and features.  
Lordship is another concept Ibn ‘Arabī used to describe the God-man 
relationship. Every creature manifests one or more of the divine names 
but a Perfect Man actualizes all divine names. Ibn ‘Arabī justified the 
relationship between God’s divine names and someone who discloses 
them in reciprocity. To describe this relationship he employed the concept 
of a ‘Lord’ (a divine name) and his servant (a holder of the name). Since 
there is no conception of a Lord without the concept of a servant, the ser-
vant cannot exist without his Lord.154 Thus, the servant exists perma-
nently because the Lord exists forever.155 The name (Lord) is within the 
Essence of God and is not separate from divine Essence. Thus, when the 
‘Lord’ appears in a servant, God appears in him. In another book, Kashf 
al-ma‘nā ‘an sirr asmāʼ Allāh al-ḥusnā, Ibn ‘Arabī identifies three levels 
of the relationship between man and the divine names ta‘alluq (depen-
dency), taḥaqquq (actuality), and takhalluq (formation).156  
Ibn ‘Arabī applied metaphor describes the mutual relationship be-
tween Lord and servant as follows: 
I venerate my Lord and He venerates me, I help Him, I understand Him, and I 
create Him while His intention is actualized through me, and I help Him by ac-






The human ‘being’ has two complete attitudes, an attitude through which he can enter 
into the divine presence and one through which he can be connected to existence. In so far 
as he is connected to existence he is servant; he is mukallaf or responsible while he was 
not there and the universe was. The human ‘being’ is also said to be lord, in so far as he is 
caliph and he is form and he is the best creation. So if he is isthmus between the universe 
and the Real, and is the synthesis of both creatures and the Real, he is mediator between 
the divine presence and the cosmos, like a line between shadow and sunlight. And this is 
true; hence there is absolute perfection for him in contingency and eternity, and there is no 
place higher than this contingency. There is absolute perfection for the universe in its con-
tingency and it has no other path to eternity (Ibn ‘Arabī, Inshāʼ, p. 22).
155  Ibn ‘Arabī, Fuṣūṣ, p. 91.
156  Ibn ‘Arabī, Kashf al-ma’nā, p. 89.
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tualizing His goals, I worship Him and He worships me, He created me and He 
is known through me.157 
This specific text sparked much scholastic controversy because Ibn 
‘Arabī posits a new interpretation for the relationship between man and 
God as one of two conscious agents who perceive each other through 
encountering and seeing. 
But moving on, Ibn ‘Arabī referred to other ḥadīth by adding that 
someone who knows himself knows his God.158 When man as servant 
knows his Lord he does not know God in His Essence but knows Him 
as his Lord, the One Who reveals Himself to His servant’s heart. Ibn 
‘Arabī therefore deduces that the Lord man knows through knowing 
himself is God, Who exists within his belief, i.e., the water takes the 
color of its cup. In Inshā᾿, he refers to man’s disposition in the universe 
as a creature, one that is time’s eternal and essential contingent. Ibn 
‘Arabī writes that the human ‘being’ fluctuates between ‘Lord’ and 
‘servant’159 and that at times God is known through the human self. For 
example, when man becomes aware of emotional modalities (anger, 
satisfaction, etc.) he attributes these to God and sometimes hears from 
God, Who says, “I will be known only through you”. Here is where 
man becomes Lord of his Lord because God’s lordliness depends on 
man’s existence.160 
Imago Dei is therefore considered the actual relationship between 
God and man, which, according to Ibn ‘Arabī, takes place in the heart 
of man. Following this consequently, the divine form of human ‘being’ 
is viewed as God’s manifestation-within and limitation-of man’s heart. 
Ibn ‘Arabī also writes that since the mystic heart can accept every form 
of God and since God can manifest in their hearts in infinite forms ac-
cording to the cosmic capacity of a mystic’s heart, for mystics God is 
formless and yet takes on all forms because the heart of a mystic en-
compasses all forms.161 Thus, there exist neither unvarying nor consti-
tuted forms of God for all human beings, as explained by Barth. Each 
person has his or her own form based on his or her belief in God. 
 
158  Ibn ‘Arabī, Fuṣūṣ, p. 50.
159  Ibn ‘Arabī, Inshāʾ, p. 22.
160  Ibn ‘Arabī, Fuṣūṣ, pp. 119-120.
161  Ibn ‘Arabī, Fuṣūṣ, p. 120.
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According to Ibn ‘Arabī, when God manifests in various forms He 
changes so that when He manifests in a human heart, that heart changes 
its terms of manifestation (tajallī) and may be comprehensive or lim-
ited. Man sees God in the form that manifests within his heart; hence, 
he believes in this manifestation of God. Man therefore determines the 
domain of God in his heart, after which God discloses Himself to man 





We introduced Judeo-Christian and Islamic interpretive approaches 
to the concept of Imago Dei and showed that Ibn ‘Arabī’s concept was 
not only similar but also expansive. Because knowledge represents the 
most significant feature of the human ‘being’, Ibn ‘Arabī insists that 
God expressly placed knowledge within the human genus by teaching 
Adam His divine names. But Ibn ‘Arabī did not define knowledge as 
reason, as did traditional Judeo-Christian scholastics such as Augustine. 
For him, knowledge preeminently includes (i) the divine names of God; 
(ii) interaction with nature and other creatures; and (iii) the encounter 
with God. He also posits that man possesses all divine names and at-
tributes, including free will and power. Moreover, Ibn ‘Arabī’s sub-
stantive approach reflects influence from Greek philosophers, 
especially Plato and Aristotle.  
Ibn ‘Arabī’s texts indicate that man is in the form of God as God’s 
vicegerent. However, unlike his Judeo-Christian counterparts, he does 
not believe God called man to partnership in the joint-venture manage-
ment of chaos in nature but rather as God’s representative with com-
plete authority over creatures and creation. In other words, God 
actualizes His affairs in the domain of creation through man.  
Ibn ‘Arabī’s relational approach takes the position of an existential 
philosopher who interprets the ‘divine form’ as the grist of a mutual 
relationship between God and man. As a mystic philosopher, he accepts 
the human ‘being’ as an other-than-God entity who exercises God’s 
divine attributes in the presence of God. Within in Islamic tradition, 
this component of his schema holds great importance because it reveals 
a new aspect of man’s relationship with God as an Absolute Being and 
man as a ‘servant’. Although familiar to mystics, Ibn ‘Arabī reformu-
285IMAGO DEI: IBN ‘ARABĪ’S PERSPECTIVE IN LIGHT OF JUDEO-CHRISTIAN TRADITION
Al-Qantara XLI 1, 2020, pp. 255-290 ISSN 0211-3589  doi: https//doi.org/10.3989/alqantara.2020.008
Alcantara  Vol XLI-1 (008)-2.qxp_Maquetación 1  26/8/20  13:24  Página 285
lates the concept within his philosophical brief and with particular sig-
nificance for anthropology. Mystics usually begin with God and end 
with Him, but Ibn ‘Arabī began with the human ‘being’ as the focal 
point through which God not only knows (sees) Himself but through 
which man also knows himself as well as the universe. At the same 
time, and since God is the only ‘being’, this mutual relationship be-
tween God and man leads to a better understanding of both God and 
man from Ibn ‘Arabī’s perspective. 
Thus, we see a theory of Imago Dei that obtains new meaning re-
garding man’s self; one that allows us to reposition our identity within 
a vast relational realm but without contradiction because of the divine 
form’s infinite attributions, which include all features of the human 
self. Being human and being God-formed therefore falls within the rec-
iprocity of a relational experience from moment-to-moment and in-
stant-to-instant for all men within the context of being, especially that 
of being in the ‘form of God’, which is a very complicated collection 
of concepts to explain. Erich Fromm wrote, “If ‘having’ seems to be a 
relatively simple concept, ‘being’, or the form ‘to be’ is all the more 





We would like to express our special thanks and gratitude to Prof. 
Dr. Mohd Hazim Shah Abdul Murad as well as Dr. Mohd Zuhdi bin 
Marsuki who gave us some valuable pieces of advice to this project on 






Adamec, Ludwig W., Historical Dictionary of Islam, Lanham Mar, Scarecrow 
Press, 2009. 
ʻAfīfī, A. E., The Mystical Philosophy of Muḥyid Dīn-Ibnnul ʻArabī, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1939. 
162  Fromm, To Have or To Be, p. 67. 
286 SAEIDEH SAYARI, MOHD ZUFRI BIN MAMAT, MAISARAH BINT HASBULLAH
Al-Qantara XLI 1, 2020, pp. 255-290 ISSN 0211-3589  doi: https//doi.org/10.3989/alqantara.2020.008
Alcantara  Vol XLI-1 (008)-2.qxp_Maquetación 1  26/8/20  13:24  Página 286
Al-Bayhaqī,. Al-Asmā᾿ wa-l-Ṣifat, Cairo, 1939. 
Al-Juwaynī, Kitāb al-irshād ilā qawāṭiʿ al-adilla fī uṣūl al-iʿtiqād (A Guide to 
Conclusive Proofs for the Principles of Belief), Reading, UK, Garnet, Center 
for Muslim Contribution to Civilization, 2010. 
Al-Juwaynī , Al-Shāmil fī Uṣūl,. Luciani (ed.), Paris, 1938. 
Aquinas T., ST.13.1a.93.2 notea, in E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. 
Thomas Aquinas, New York, Random House, 1956. 
Augustine, The Trinity, John E. Rotelle (ed.) and Edmund Hill (trans.), New York, 
New City Press, 1991. 
Badawī, A. A., Mawsūʻat al-Falsafa, Beirut, al-Muwʼ, 1984. 
Baqlī Shīrāzī, Sharḥ-i Shaṭḥīyāt, Henry Corbin (ed.), Tehran-Paris, Departemant 
d’Iranologie de 1’Institut Franco-Iranien and Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1966. 
Barth, Karl and Bromiley, Geoffrey William, Church Dogmatics, Edinburgh, T. 
& T. Clark, 1958. 
Barth, Karl, Table Talk, John D. Godsey (ed.), Richmond VA, John Knox Press, 1962.  
Barth, Karl, The Humanity of God, Thomas Wieser and John N. Thomas (trans.), 
Richmond, VA, John Knox Press, 1960.  
Berkower, Gerrit C., Man: The Image of God, Studies in Dogmatics, Grand 
Rapids MI, WM B Eerdmans, 1962.  
Brunner, Emil, Justice and the Social Order, London, Lutterworth Press, 1945.  
Brunner, Emil, Man in Revolt, Olive Wyon (trans.), Philadelphia, the Westminster 
Press, 1947. 
Brunner, Emil, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, Olive Wyon 
(trans.), Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 1953. 
Cairnes, David, The Image of God in Man, Introduction by David E. Jenkins. 
Fontana, Library of Theology and Philosophy, London, SCM, 1953. 
Chittick, William C., The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn Al-ʻArabī’s Metaphysics 
of Imagination, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1989. 
Chittick, William C., Imaginal Worlds: Ibn al-ʻArabī and the problem of religious 
diversity, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1994. 
Chittick, William C., The Self-disclosure of God; Principles of Ibn Al-ʻArabī’s 
Cosmology, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1998. 
Chittick, William C., Ibn ʻArabi: Heir To The Prophets, Oxford, Oneworld Press, 
2005. 
Chodkiewicz, Michel, Seal of the Saint, Liadain Sherrard (trans.), Cambridge, 
The Islamic Texts Society, 1993. 
Cillis, Maria de, Free Will and Predestination in Islamic Thought: Theoretical 
Compromises in the Works of Avicenna, Ghāzālī and Ibn ‘Arabī, London-New 
York, Routledge, 2014. 
Clark, Jane, “Fulfilling our Potential: Ibn ‘Arabī’s Understanding of Man in a 
Contemporary Context”, Journal of Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabī Society, 30 (2001), 
pp. 35-42. 
287IMAGO DEI: IBN ‘ARABĪ’S PERSPECTIVE IN LIGHT OF JUDEO-CHRISTIAN TRADITION
Al-Qantara XLI 1, 2020, pp. 255-290 ISSN 0211-3589  doi: https//doi.org/10.3989/alqantara.2020.008
Alcantara  Vol XLI-1 (008)-2.qxp_Maquetación 1  26/8/20  13:24  Página 287
Clines, David J.A., “The Image of God in Man”, Tyndale Bulletin, 19 (1968), 53-
103. 
Corbin, Henry, Alone with the Alone: Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn 
ʻArabī, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1998.  
Crabb, Lurry, Understanding People; Deep longings for Relationship, Grand 
Rapids MI, Zondervan Publishing House, 1987.  
Daylamī, Abū l-Ḥassan A.M., A Treatise on Mystical Love, Joseph N. Bell and 
Hassan Mahmoud A.L. Al Shafie (eds. and trans.), Edinburgh, Edinburgh Uni-
versity Press, 2005.  
Elmore, Gerald, “Four Texts of Ibn ʻArabī on the Creative Self-manifestation of 
the Divine Names”, Journal of the Muḥyiddin Ibn ʻArabī Society, 29 (2001), 
pp. 45-66. 
Erickson Millard J., Christian Theology, Grand Rapids MI, Baker Book House, 
1983-85.  
Fromm, Erich, To Have or To Be, London-New York, Continuum, 1976, 1997.  
Ghazzālī A.Ḥ., Kitāb al-Imlā᾿ fī ishkālāt al-Iḥyā᾿ Ulūm al-Dīn, Cairo, nd, 5 Vols. 
Ghazzālī A.Ḥ., al-Maqṣad al-Asnā fī Sharḥ Ma‘ānī Asmā᾿ Allāh al-Ḥusnā, F.A. 
Shehadi (ed.), Beirut, Dār al-Mashriq, 1971.  
Ghazzālī A.Ḥ., Mishkāt al-Anwār, A.A. ‘Afīfī (ed.), Cairo, Dār al-Qawmīya li-l-
Ṭabā‘a wa-l-Nashr, 1963.  
Ghazzālī, Iḥyā᾿ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn, ed. A.B. B.H. Ḥāfiz Irāqī, nd, Beirut, Dār Al-Kitāb 
Al-‘Arabī. 
Genesis, English Standard Version (ESV), 2001. 
Gross, Heinrich. “Die Gottebenbildlichkeit des Menschen.” Lex tua veritas; Fest-
schrift fur Hubert Junker zu Vollendung des siebzigsten Lebensjahres am 8 
August 1961. Trier: Paulinus-Verlag, 1961, pp. 89-100. 
Hefner P.J., “The Human Being” in Christian Dogmatics (vol. 1, pp. 323-340), 
C.E. Braaten and R.W. Jenson (eds.), Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1960, pp. 
323-340. 
Hehn, Johannes, “Zum Terminus ‘Bild Gottes’”, in Gotthold Weil (ed.), Fest-
schrift Eduard Sachau: Zum Siebstigsten Geburtstage, Berlin, Reimer, 1915, 
pp. 36-52. Quoted in Herzfeld (1999). 
Herzfeld, Norren LuAnn, “Imago Dei/Imago Hominis: Interacting Images of God 
and Humanity in Theology and in Artificial Intelligence”, Doctoral Disserta-
tion, California, University of Berkeley, 1999.  
Ibn ʻArabī, Al-Futūḥāt Al-Makkīya, A. A. ʻAfīfī (ed.), Cairo, Dār Al-kutub Al-
ʻArabīya Al-kubrā, 4 Vols., 1911. 
Ibn ʻArabī, al-Tadbīrāt al-Ilāhīya fi Iṣlāḥ al-Mamlaka al-Insānīya, Leiden, E.J. 
Brill, 1914. 
Ibn ʻArabī, Inshāʼ al-Dawāʼir, B. al-ʻArabī (ed.), Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1914.  
Ibn ʻArabī, Fuṣūṣ Al-Ḥikam, A. A. ʻAfīfī (ed.), Beirut, Dār Al-Kitāb Al-‘Arabī, 
1946. 
288 SAEIDEH SAYARI, MOHD ZUFRI BIN MAMAT, MAISARAH BINT HASBULLAH
Al-Qantara XLI 1, 2020, pp. 255-290 ISSN 0211-3589  doi: https//doi.org/10.3989/alqantara.2020.008
Alcantara  Vol XLI-1 (008)-2.qxp_Maquetación 1  26/8/20  13:24  Página 288
Ibn ̒ Arabī, Al-Insān al-Kāmil, M. M. al-Qurāb (ed.), Damascus, Maṭba‘t Naḍr, 1990. 
Ibn ʻArabī, Kashf al-ma‘nā ‘an sirr asmāʼ Allāh al-ḥusnā, S. ‘A. Al-Manṣub (ed.), 
Pakistan, Ibn al-Arabi Foundation, 2013. 
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